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Abstract
It is often unclear which factor plays a more critical role in determining a group’s performance: the diversity among
members of the group or their individual abilities. In this study, we addressed this ‘‘diversity vs. ability’’ issue in a decision-
making task. We conducted three simulation studies in which we manipulated agents’ individual ability (or accuracy, in the
context of our investigation) and group diversity by varying (1) the heuristics agents used to search task-relevant
information (i.e., cues); (2) the size of their groups; (3) how much they had learned about a good cue search order; and (4)
the magnitude of errors in the information they searched. In each study, we found that a manipulation reducing agents’
individual accuracy simultaneously increased their group’s diversity, leading to a conflict between the two. These conflicts
enabled us to identify certain conditions under which diversity trumps individual accuracy, and vice versa. Specifically, we
found that individual accuracy is more important in task environments in which cues differ greatly in the quality of their
information, and diversity matters more when such differences are relatively small. Changing the size of a group and the
amount of learning by an agent had a limited impact on this general effect of task environment. Furthermore, we found that
a group achieves its highest accuracy when there is an intermediate amount of errors in the cue information, regardless of
the environment and the heuristic used, an effect that we believe has not been previously reported and warrants further
investigation.
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Introduction
Scientists from a variety of disciplines have studied extensively
the abilities of humans and animals to solve problems in groups
[1–4]. Of the factors identified as affecting a group’s performance,
two appear especially important: the diversity among members of
a group and their individual abilities [3,5–7]. However, the
contributions of these two factors to group performance are not
always equal. In judgment tasks where the value of a continuous
variable of interest needs to be estimated, diversity has been shown
to matter more than individual ability [4,5,8]; in problem-solving
tasks where the problems are technical or mathematical in nature
and difficult to solve, the reverse tends to be true [8–10]. In other
tasks, such as decision-making and creative problem solving, it is
often unclear which factor plays a more critical role [3,10–12]. In
this study, we tried to address this ‘‘diversity vs. ability’’ issue in a
decision-making task. Through three simulation studies in which
we systematically manipulated variables affecting both factors, we
identified conditions when diversity trumps ability, and vice versa.
In the type of decision problems probed in our study, an agent
or a group of agents was asked to decide which of two options (e.g.,
two patches) had a larger value on a certain criterion (e.g., amount
of food) on the basis of some relevant cues (e.g., smell, visual
pattern, etc.). Of the possible individual strategies applicable to
make this decision, we implemented two in this study that belong
to the family of ‘‘fast and frugal’’ heuristics [13–15]: take-the-best
and minimalist (see details of their algorithms in Methods and
Analyses). They are heuristics because they do not attempt to
search for all the available cues and integrate information from all
searched cues to make a decision. Instead, they search cues
sequentially and employ a simple ‘‘one-reason’’ decision-making
mechanism; that is, search stops as soon as a difference between
two options on a cue is found and a decision is made according to
their values on this stopping cue alone. The two heuristics differ in
their search rules: Whereas take-the-best searches cues in the order
of their validities, a measure of cue information quality, minimalist
searches cues randomly.
We focused on take-the-best and minimalist in this study for two
reasons. First, heuristics with structures identical or similar to those
of take-the-best and minimalist have been found to be adopted by
both humans and other species [15–19]. For example, when
choosing between two mating candidates, female guppies, Poecilia
reticulata, often rely on two cues: the amount of orange body color
(a genetic cue) and whether another female has mated with the
candidate before (a social cue). A female guppy will use the social
cue only when the difference between two males on the genetic cue
is not large enough (,40%) [18]. In another example, when
deciding which flower of two matches a model flower for foraging,
honeybees usually check cues in the order of odor, color, and
shape, using a latter cue only when the earlier cue or cues fail to
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easily extended to a group context, but this can be done for the
foraging strategy of honeybees: Each individual bee in a colony
may adopt a strategy similar to the one just described, and then
they may apply a majority or quorum rule to make a group
decision where to forage [20].
The second reason why we focused on take-the-best and
minimalist is that their different search rules enable us to examine
the relative contributions of diversity and ability in group decision-
making. Specifically, in the context of our study, ability was
represented by the average decision accuracy achieved by
individual agents in a group, and diversity was captured by the
range of information searched and the subsequent decisions made
by their group collectively. The ability of a group of agents using
take-the-best (the take-the-best group) tends to be higher than that
of a group of minimalist agents (the minimalist group), due to the
better search rule implemented in take-the-best. However, the
diversity level of the former is typically lower than that of the
latter, because searching cues randomly usually leads each
minimalist agent to search a different set of cues, increasing the
collective cue set explored by the group.
The contrasts between the take-the-best and minimalist groups
formed the basis of our investigation. In three studies, we
examined groups’ performances in four task environments that
differed in the distribution of cues’ validities (see Methods and
Analyses), which has been found as an ecological variable critical
to the individual decision accuracies of the take-the-best and
minimalist agents [21,22]. On the platform of these four task
environments, we compared: (1) take-the-best and minimalist
groups with varying group sizes; (2) take-the-best groups with
agents who had different amounts of learning regarding the cue
validity order; and (3) groups, both take-the-best and minimalist,
with agents who made decisions based on cue information with
varied degrees of errors. All of the three variables, group size,
individual learning, and information errors, can directly affect
individual accuracy and/or diversity and indirectly affect their
contributions to group decision accuracy. Finally, after each agent
within a group made an individual decision, a simple majority rule
was applied to determine the group decision. Although it is a
popular aggregation rule adopted by many groups in realistic
settings [20,23,24], the rule itself does not explicitly consider the
possible communications among group members and how the
information or decisions by others (i.e., public information) may
affect the quality of group decisions [4,25,26].
Results and Discussion
Study 1: Group Size
In this set of simulations, we pitted a take-the-best group directly
against a minimalist group, with group size m ranging from 1 to
100. Here, we assumed that all agents in the take-the-best group
searched cues in the same order, the order according to cues’
objective validities, and the information from each cue was error
free. In this way, the individual accuracy of a take-the-best agent
was at its maximum, but the diversity of the take-the-best group
was at its minimum—zero—because all take-the-best agents
searched the same cues and made the same decisions. Conse-
quently, there was no difference between the decisions of a take-
the-best agent and those of a take-the-best group; thus, group size
had no effect on this group’s decision accuracy. In contrast, a
larger group size could still increase the diversity level of a
minimalist group (see File S1 for the diversity results) and affect its
decision accuracy positively. The results of this study are shown in
Figure 1.
Three main results can be seen from Figure 1. First, the
minimalist group, which had a higher level of diversity but a lower
level of individual accuracy, outperformed the take-the-best group,
which had the opposite characteristics, in task environments where
the distribution of cue validities was relatively flat (e.g., the small-
difference, SD, environment) and when group size was moderately
large (m.4). Second, it was very difficult for a minimalist group to
beat a take-the-best group when cues differed drastically in their
validities. In the large-difference (LD) environment, for instance,
the accuracy of a minimalist group with 100 agents still lagged far
behind that of a take-the-best group, which was equivalent to the
accuracy of one take-the-best agent. Third, group size had a
positive effect on the accuracy of minimalist groups, but the effect
became increasingly smaller when group size got larger. The pool
of information (e.g., number of cues) from which agents draw their
decisions constrained the effect of group size: The more scarce the
information, the less the effect, and the fewer members will a
group need to reach the highest level of accuracy [6].
Overall, the results in this study show that the relative
importance of group diversity and individual accuracy depends
on the informational characteristics of the task environment.
When information is more evenly distributed among the cues,
searching as many cues as possible by a group, which often
depends on the size of the group and is a direct outcome of group
diversity, will be more critical to the group’s decision accuracy
than agents’ ability to make accurate decisions on their own.
However, when the quality of the cues’ information differs
significantly, agents’ knowledge of such differences, which results
in higher individual accuracy, will matter more than the diversity
of their group.
Study 2: Individual Learning
Although the extreme uniformity of the take-the-best group in
Study 1 was the logical outcome of the two assumptions made in
that study, it is questionable whether these assumptions hold in
reality. Let us start with cue order. Experiments with human
participants have shown that different take-the-best users often
search cues in different orders [27,28]. Such variance is partly due
to the varied experiences people have with the cues that can affect
their perceptions of cues’ validities. To reflect such individual
differences, we incorporated a learning component for the take-
the-best agents in this set of simulations (see details in Methods and
Analyses).
In general, each take-the-best agent started without knowledge
of cues’ validities and had to learn them through a randomly
drawn learning sample. After this learning process, which typically
resulted in agents learning different cue orders, a group of five
agents were asked to make decisions on a common sample. We
manipulated the number of options, n, in the learning sample
experienced by each take-the-best agent. It varied from as small as
10 to as large as the entire population, in which all agents were
assumed to eventually learn the objective cue validity order. The
results of this study are illustrated in Figure 2. Because the results
in the MD and ND environments were similar to the results in the
LD and SD environments, respectively, for the sake of brevity,
only results from the LD and SD environments are shown in
Figure 2.
In the LD environment, one can see three major results
(Figure 2). First, even a small amount of learning could help a take-
the-best agent perform much better than a minimalist agent that
was assumed to know nothing about cues’ validities. Second,
learning created diversity among take-the-best agents (see File S1
for the diversity results), which in turn created a positive difference
between the accuracy of a take-the-best group and that of a single
Diversity vs. Ability
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group of five take-the-best agents who knew less about cues’
validity orders failed to beat one take-the-best agent who knew the
order perfectly in this environment, as seen in the population
condition. This shows again that in environments such as the LD
in which cues differ greatly in their quality, it is essential for
decision makers—either individuals or groups—to know which
cues are informational and which are not and to search and use
them accordingly.
The results in the SD environment differ from those in the LD
environment. When learning was limited (from n=10 to 50), a
take-the-best agent always performed better than a minimalist
agent, as did a take-the-best group over a minimalist group. Even
though the two groups’ performance differences were small, they
were all in favor of the take-the-best group, which is in contrast to
the result in Study 1 in the same environment (Figure 1). Why?
Unlike in Study 1, there was diversity in the take-the-best group
here. Furthermore, in the SD environment, because cues’ validities
were very close to each other, their differences in a learning sample
were largely determined by random sampling errors. This made it
difficult for take-the-best agents to learn the objective cue validity
order and caused a rather flat learning curve with increased
learning experience. However, for the same reason, it also became
quite likely that one take-the-best agent would learn one cue order
from its own sample while another agent would learn a different
order from another, independent sample. This high level of
diversity in cue order led to a high level of diversity in the
information a take-the-best group searched for collectively.
Combined with their higher individual accuracy, a group of
learning take-the-best agents was now well equipped to outper-
form a group of minimalist agents in the SD environment.
With more learning, a take-the-best agent eventually achieved
its best individual accuracy in the population condition; however,
it is in this condition that the take-the-best group’s performance
dropped and became worse than that of the minimalist group once
again. This occurred because the take-the-best agents, with the
knowledge of the objective cue validity order, started to search
uniformly again, and the whole group lost the diversity it once
enjoyed when learning was limited. Such a loss of diversity was
detrimental to the group’s performance in environments like SD,
where gathering a large quantity of information is more critical
than knowing the quality of each piece of information.
Study 3: Information Errors
Having addressed the issue of cue order through the control of
individual learning, let us now turn to the quality of cue
information. When agents search cues either in their memory or
from the environment, there is no guarantee that the cue values
they obtain will be perfectly accurate [29,30]. When there are
random errors in cue values, different agents may make different
Figure 1. Results from Study 1: group size. Note that there was no effect of group size on a take-the-best (TTB) group’s performance in this set
of simulations, because the group was assumed to be totally homogeneous. MIN-1, MIN-5, MIN-15, and MIN-100 stand for a minimalist group with 1,
5, 15, and 100 agents, respectively. Environments differed in their distribution of cue validities: LD, large difference; MD, medium difference; SD, small
difference; ND, no difference. PC: Percentage correct.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031043.g001
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same decision heuristic and search cues in the same order.
For instance, suppose that two flowers A and B are described by
three cues: odor, color, and shape, and a cue value of ‘‘1’’ indicates
flowers with better foraging values in terms of nectar content or
pollen quality. Suppose further that A and B are with cue values of
[1,0,1] and [1,1,0], respectively. Without information error, a
take-the-best agent would stop search at the color cue and choose
B. Meanwhile, if another take-the-best agent mistakenly perceives
the color cue’s value on B as ‘‘0’’ instead of ‘‘1,’’ it would stop
search at the shape cue and choose A instead. Allowing for such
errors in a task, it is possible that a group of take-the-best agents
would stop search at different cues, leading them to make different
decisions. On the other hand, the individual accuracy of these
agents is likely to decrease because errors will reduce the quality of
the cue information on which their decisions are based.
We created erroneous cue information by adding a random
error component to the cues’ true values (see details in Methods
and Analyses). The magnitude of errors was controlled by s, the
standard deviation of the error distribution. Five levels of s, 0, 0.2,
0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, were applied in this set of simulations, with a
higher s making it more likely that a cue’s apparent value would
deviate from its objective value. We investigated the effects of
information errors on both types of agents and groups, take-the-
best and minimalist, and the results are shown in Figure 3. Because
the results in the MD and ND environments resembled those in
the LD and SD environments, respectively, only results from the
LD and SD environments are shown.
From Figure 3, we see that information errors were clearly
detrimental to individual accuracy: As the error magnitude
increased from s=0 to 0.8, both take-the-best and minimalist
agents made less and less accurate decisions. However, the effect of
these errors on group accuracy was not that straightforward. In all
environments, the following general pattern emerged: With a
larger error magnitude, group performance started to get better,
reached its best at some intermediate error level, and only got
worse slowly afterward. In other words, the right magnitude of
information errors could actually help a group make better
decisions than when there was no error. This rather counterin-
tuitive result was observed no matter which heuristic, take-the-best
or minimalist, agents were using and how cue validities were
distributed. Why?
The reason, we speculate, is the two opposing effects random
information errors had on group decisions. On the one hand, they
undermined individual agents’ performances by making cue values
noisier and reducing the qualities of cues. This in turn reduced
each agent’s contribution to the group, dragging the group’s
performance down. On the other hand, those errors diversified the
information searched by a group of agents and their individual
decisions (see File S1 for the diversity results), and this increased
diversity could push the group’s performance up. With informa-
tion errors in a task, these two opposing effects always existed but
did not always cancel each other out perfectly. With smaller
magnitudes of errors, the gain of group accuracy due to added
diversity could compensate for the loss due to reduced individual
accuracy, resulting in a net accuracy gain. As the magnitude of
errors increased, the gain would reach its maximum at some
intermediate level, with its exact value depending on factors such
as the heuristic used, the cue validity distribution, and the size of
the group. Finally, when there was too much error, the group
accuracy gain disappeared, and groups would perform below the
level they could achieve with no information error.
In addition to the finding that an intermediate amount of
information errors can actually improve groups’ decision accuracy,
two other results deserve mention. First, group performance
appeared quite robust against information errors. Even when
errors were large and had severely reduced agents’ individual
accuracy (s=0.8), groups could still perform quite well compared
to when there was no error (s=0). Second, information errors did
not alter the general pattern of the take-the-best and minimalist
Figure 2. Results from Study 2: individual learning. Because the results in the MD and ND environments were similar to the results in the LD
and SD environments, respectively, only results from the LD and SD environments are shown for the sake of brevity. Group size was 5 for all groups
from which the results were derived, and the amount of learning was measured by the number of options in a learning sample. The lines for
minimalist agents and groups are flat because no learning was assumed to take place for a minimalist agent in this set of simulations. Pop:
Population. MIN-Group and MIN-Ind.: Minimalist group and individual agents. TTB-Group and TTB-Ind.: Take-the-best group and individual agents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031043.g002
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the-best group still performed better than a minimalist group in
the LD environment and worse in the SD environment.
Information errors did add diversity to both groups; however, as
long as all take-the-best agents searched cues in the same order,
their group would be less diverse than a minimalist group, making
it difficult for the former to beat the latter in the SD environment.
Discussion
Group diversity is often credited as the main reason for the
remarkable intelligence and achievements demonstrated by human
and animal groups [3,31,32]. Using computer simulations and
mathematical analyses, Hong and Page [33] predicted that a group
ofrandomly selected agents (themore diverse group)could intheory
outperform a group of best-performing agents (the group with
higher ability) in searching for the best solution to a problem (e.g.,
the designof a gasoline engine). In a study by Krause and colleagues
[8], this ‘‘diversity-can-trump-ability’’ prediction was confirmed in
one experiment in which human participantswereasked to estimate
thenumberofmarbles ina jar, butnotinanotherinwhich the same
group of participants were asked to solve an abstract statistical
problem. Following the footprints of these two studies, we tried to
understand the roles of diversity and ability in a task of group
decision-making instead of problem solving or number judgment,
aiming to identify conditions when diversity can trump ability and
vice versa through three simulation studies.
We found that a conflict between ability, represented by
individual decision accuracy, and diversity was present in each of
the three studies. In Study 1, it was a take-the-best group versus a
minimalist group with varying group sizes; in Study 2, it was a
group of take-the-best agents who knew the cue validity order
outright versus another group of take-the-best agents who had to
learn it; and in Study 3, it was one group of agents who made their
decisions based on error-free information versus another group
whose decisions were based on erroneous information. These
conflicts indicate that it can be difficult to maintain high levels of
diversity and ability within a group simultaneously—a manipula-
tion augmenting one often ends up hurting the other [34,35]—and
show why trying to draw a definite conclusion of this ‘‘diversity vs.
ability’’ debate could be a futile pursuit.
Controlling and exploring the effects of four task variables, we
identified some conditions under which a more diverse group,
despite having a lower level of individual accuracy, made more
accurate group decisions than another group with the opposite
characteristics, and vice versa. In general, we found that the
informational characteristics of a task environment—the distribu-
tion of cues’ validities in particular for the task focused on in this
study—play a critical role in determining the winner of this
diversity–ability battle (see Figures 1–3). In environments where
good cues are very good and bad cues are quite bad, having a
group of agents who can use this disparity properly and as a result
achieve higher individual accuracy is more important than having
another group of agents who know little and can only rely on
diversity to boost their group’s performance; in other environ-
ments where cues are close in the quality of their information, the
reverse tends to be true. Moreover, we found that task
environment strongly moderates the effects of group size
(Figure 1) and individual learning (Figure 2), but to a much lesser
extent the effect of information errors (Figure 3).
Information is critical to the survival of an organism in the
environment that is not always reliable, due to the instability of the
environment (e.g., bad weathers) and the limited information
processing ability of the organism (e.g., in perception and
memory). Erroneous information, as shown in our Study 3, will
reduce the decision accuracy of an individual and possibly its
fitness if decisions are assumed to be consequential. However, this
obstacle can be easily overcome by a group of individuals, so much
so that a group is even able to achieve a higher level of accuracy
with erroneous information than with error-free information. The
Figure 3. Results from Study 3: information errors. Because the results in the MD and ND environments were similar to the results in the LD
and SD environments, respectively, only results from the LD and SD environments are shown for the sake of brevity. Group size was 5 for all groups
from which the results were derived, and the magnitude of error was measured as the standard deviation of a normal distribution from which the
random errors were generated. MIN-Group and MIN-Ind.: Minimalist group and individual agents. TTB-Group and TTB-Ind.: Take-the-best group and
individual agents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031043.g003
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[3,23,31]; however, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
study demonstrating this overcompensation effect of erroneous
information. The effect shows how ‘‘flawed’’ individuals may rely
on groups to achieve feats that cannot be reached by each of them,
and implies that groups should be tolerant towards, even
welcoming, the occasional errors made by its members.
Finally, a frequent feature of group decision-making is the use of
public information by group members [25,26,36]. In our study,
public information can be conveyed as either the actual decisions
made by other members (e.g., flowers other bees choose to forage)
or the cue orders they adopt to reach their decisions. It has been
shown that such information can be beneficial to the accuracy of
individual members who apply heuristics such as take-the-best and
minimalist to make decisions, but only to a limited extent to their
groups [37,38]. A likely effect of public information is the
convergence of members’ knowledge and decisions, which, as
demonstrated in both our Study 2 and other studies [4,6,26], will
reduce group diversity and may be detrimental to the accuracy of
group decisions and judgments. From our perspective, public
information is a double-edged sword like learning and information
errors, because of its conflicting effects on individual accuracy and
group diversity. To understand more precisely how it affects the
overall group performance could be a meaningful topic for future
research.
Methods and Analyses
Take-the-Best and Minimalist
Take-the-best is composed of three rules that cover the
processes of searching, stopping search, and deciding: (1) It
searches cues sequentially in the order of their validities (defined
below); (2) assuming that cues are expressed in or can be converted
to binary values, search stops whenever two options have different
values on a cue (i.e., [1, 0] or [0, 1]); and (3) a decision is made
according to the options’ values on the cue that stops search, with
the option having a higher cue value usually inferred as having a
larger criterion value. If all the cues are searched and none of them
differ in their values on the two options, a decision will be made
through random guessing. The rules of minimalist are similar to
those of take-the-best, with one exception: Instead of searching by
their validity order, minimalist searches cues randomly. This
makes minimalist generally less accurate than take-the-best, and
the larger the differences among cues’ validities, the larger the
accuracy gap between the two heuristics [13].
A cue’s validity V is calculated by V=R/(R+W), where R and W
are the number of correct (right) and incorrect (wrong) decisions,
respectively, made by using that cue when two options have
different values on it. The measure of validity is mathematically
related to the Goodman-Kruskal Gamma coefficient that has been
used in a broad range of tasks [39]. A cue’s objective validity is
defined as its validity in a population of options, which may differ
from its validity derived from a sample. In addition, if a cue is
positively correlated with the criterion, V should have a value
larger than 0.5. When V is less than 0.5, it implies that the decision
rule should be used in the reverse way.
Simulation Architecture
All of our simulations were programed and run in Matlab. To
simulate the task studied here, we need to generate one criterion
variable and several cue variables correlated with it, such that each
cue can carry some diagnostic value. In the case of honeybee
foraging, for example, the criterion variable may be the
attractiveness of a flower that correlates to certain extents with
the odor of the flower, the particle size of its pollens, and the
handling time required for extraction [40]. A popular way to
generate these variables in simulations is to create a criterion that
is the linear combination of the cues and a random error
component [41]. Five independent cues were first generated in our
simulations and then combined to create the criterion variable
using the following equation:
Y~b1:X1zb2:X2zb3:X3zb4:X4zb5:X5zbe:Xe
In the equation, Y is the criterion variable, Xi is a cue variable with
a standardized normal distribution N(0,1), and bi is the linear
coefficient of each cue variable Xi. Xe is the error term, which also
has an N(0,1) distribution, and be is its linear coefficient. The
number of cues was set at five because pilot simulations showed
that more than three cues were needed to achieve a high enough
level of diversity for the minimalist group and the probability of
searching beyond five cues by either take-the-best or minimalist
was very small.
Using this general equation, we created four task environments,
each characterized by a different set of bs; their specific values can
be seen in Table 1. We called the first one the large-difference
(LD) environment, for there was a large variance among the cues’
linear coefficients. The variance decreased gradually from the LD
to the medium-difference (MD), the small-difference (SD), and
finally the no-difference (ND) environment, where cue coefficients
were equal. Despite the apparent differences in the four
environments, they did have one thing in common: Cues in each
environment could together account for almost the same
proportion of variance in the criterion variable.
Because take-the-best and minimalist use binary cues to make
decisions, it is necessary to dichotomize the cues. We used the
median of a cue’s value distribution as the cutoff, above which a
cue value was converted to 1 and below which to 0. All cue
validities were then calculated (see Table 1). As the table shows,
the larger the b, the higher the validity in an environment.
Therefore, the differences in cues’ bs were transferred directly to
the differences in their validities. As a result, there was a highly
dispersed distribution of cue validities in the LD environment and
Table 1. The Linear Coefficients (b) and Validities (V) of the Five Cues in Four Task Environments.
Environment b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, be V1, V2, V3, V4, V5 Variance accounted for by the cues (%)
Large difference 0.37, 0.23, 0.11, 0.07, 0.04, 0.18 0.86, 0.71, 0.60, 0.57, 0.54 0.865
Medium difference 0.26, 0.20, 0.16, 0.13, 0.11, 0.16 0.78, 0.71, 0.67, 0.64, 0.61 0.864
Small difference 0.19, 0.18, 0.17, 0.16, 0.15, 0.15 0.71, 0.70, 0.69, 0.68, 0.67 0.866
No difference 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.17, 0.15 0.69, 0.69, 0.69, 0.69, 0.69 0.865
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031043.t001
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SD environments in between.
With a continuous criterion variable and five binary cues (after
dichotomization) making up our simulated data, we took the
following general steps to obtain a group’s decision accuracy in a
certain task environment:
Step 1: Draw a random sample of data with n options in
it.
Step 2: For any pair of options in the sample, implement
the rules of either take-the-best or minimalist to make an
individual decision for an agent.
Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until all m agents in a group make
their decisions.
Step 4: Apply the simple-majority rule to make a group
decision.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 2–4 until all pairs of options in the
sample are compared.
Step 6: Calculate both the agents’ and their groups’
decision accuracy within a sample based on options’
actual criterion values.
Step 7: Repeat Steps 1–6 with N random samples and
use the means of the results from all samples as the final
results.
Specific Simulation Procedures
In Study 1 (group size), there were 15 options (n=15), which
produced 105 pairs of options (15614/2) in each random sample.
Four group sizes were examined: m=1, 5, 15, and 100; and for
each group size, 10,000 samples were run to get the results.
In Study 2 (individual learning), there were two types of samples
in each run. The first was the learning sample, in which a take-the-
best agent calculated each cue’s validity based on all possible pairs
of options in the sample. For a group of m agents, m random
samples were drawn for learning, one for each agent. Then, there
was the testing sample. Unlike the learning sample, there was only
one testing sample for a group. All agents would use the cue
validity orders they had learned previously to guide their search
and decision-making in this common sample. The size of the
learning sample, as measured by the number of options in the
sample n, was the parameter manipulated in this study. Five levels
were tested: 10, 15, 25, 50, and population. In all conditions, the
size of the group was set at 5, each testing sample consisted of 15
objects, and 10,000 random samples were run for both learning
and testing.
In Study 3 (information errors), errors in cues’ binary values
were created by adding a certain amount of random errors to cues’
continuous values before dichotomization. These errors con-
formed to an N(0, s) distribution, with the parameter s varied to
control the error magnitude. At a given error level, an
independent set of random errors was added to each cue and
for each group member. Hence, for i cues and m members, a total
of i*m sets of random errors were generated. Five values of s were
applied; and the larger the s, the more likely that a cue’s binary
values would flip. In all conditions, the group size was set at 5, the
number of objects in a task sample was 15, and 10,000 random
samples were run to get the results.
Supporting Information
File S1 Diversity Results. The results are shown in three
sheets in the Excel file, corresponding to the results in Study 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
(XLS)
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